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American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Anglo-Saxon Ethnogenesis in the 
'Universal' Nation, 1776-18501 
 
ERIC KAUFMANN 
European Institute, The London School of Economics and Political Science,  
          Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The history of nativism in the United States has received considerable scholarly 
attention, yet the few systematic attempts to explain it have focused predominantly on 
psychological or economic causes.  This paper asserts that such explanations fail to 
address the crucial cultural dimension of the nativism issue, which must be analyzed 
through the prism of historical sociology. Specifically, this paper argues that American 
nativism cannot be understood without reference to an 'American' national ethnic group 
whose myth-symbol complex had developed prior to the large-scale immigration of the 
mid-nineteenth century. Without understanding this social construction, it is difficult to 
explain subsequent attempts to defend it. This paper, therefore, does not seek to retrace 
the history of American nativism. Instead, it focuses on the period prior to 1850, when 
American nativism was in its infancy. It  examines the development of an Anglo-
American ethnicity during 1776-1850 and attempts to delineate its structure. This 
'American' complex of myths and symbols, with its attendant set of lifestyle images and 
narratives, is shown to conform to more general models recently presented by theorists of 
ethnicity and nationalism. Finally, it is argued that American nativism may have 
exhibited a very different pattern if an 'American' national ethnicity had not taken root. 
                                                          
1 This article is based upon a paper delivered at the British Association of American Studies Annual 
Conference held at the University of Birmingham, 4-7 April, 1997.  
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 The literature on American nativism has tended to ascribe American nativist 
agitation, which began in earnest just prior to 1850, to short-run economic or 
psychological causes.2  The origins of this approach can be traced to the early progressive 
"race" theorists of the 1920's and 30's, with their belief that "Racial hatreds, national 
hatreds, group hatreds have always rooted deeply in man's fight against man for the 
means of subsistence and display…."3 Yet, such a stance clearly fails to explain why 
outbreaks of nativism (the 1920's, for example) have tended not to correlate with poor 
economic times (such as the early 1930's). An approach that stresses the impact of ad hoc 
national "moods" or economic hardship on nativism likewise fails to appreciate the 
importance of the cultural-historical substratum which conditions the nature of an ethnic 
group's response to other groups. 
 Why did Anglo-Protestant Americans assume the mantle of nativism? This seems 
like a straightforward question, but it is not. First of all, as some have suggested, the term 
"nativism" is a misnomer, and has been as much a didactic tool as a hermeneutic device.4 
In fact, native residence served merely as a shorthand for membership in the dominant 
national ethnic group. "Sometimes, nativists found the native-born 'foreign' and 
immigrants suitably American," remarks Dale Knobel.5 Indeed, Anglo-Protestant 
Americans barely blinked at British (and Anglo-Canadian) Protestant immigration, yet 
native-born Catholics were hardly immune from nativism. "Ethno-nationalism" or 
"dominant ethnicity" is therefore a more accurate description for what passes for 
nativism. Furthermore, any explanation of dominant-group ethno-nationalism demands a 
                                                          
2 See, for example, Pozzetta 1991, Curran 1975, Solomon 1956 or Higham 1955. 
3 Baker, Newton Diehl, Carlton J.H. Hayes, Roger Williams Straus (eds.), The American Way: A Study of 
Human Relations Among Protestants, Catholics and Jews (Chicago & New York: Willett, Clark & 
Company, 1936), 94, emphasis added. 
4 This opinion has been expressed by Linda Bosniak in her essay, " 'Nativism' the Concept: Some 
Reflections," in Juan F. Perea (ed.), Immigrants Out!: The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse 
in the United States (New York, N.Y. & London: New York University Press, 1997), 279-99. 
5 Dale T. Knobel, "America for Americans": The Nativist Movement in the United States (New York: 
Twayne, 1996), xiii. 
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mapping of the dominant ethnic group which arose within the supposedly exceptional, 
universalist, American nation-state.  
 
Theorizing American National Ethnicity  
 
National Ethnicity 
 
Ethnic groups will be defined here as communities which share a belief in common 
ancestry and homeland and which meet a threshold requirement of population and 
territory (real or imagined) that distinguishes them from similar phenomena like tribes 
and clans.6 Nations, on the other hand, will be defined as modern communities of mass 
culture whose members share a politico-territorial identity and are bound together by 
shared legal obligations, an official culture and a common history.7 
 The nations of the world, almost without exception, were formed from ethnic 
cores, whose pre-modern myth-symbol complex furnished the material for the 
construction of the modern nation's boundary symbols and civil religion. This does not 
entail the continuation of an ethnie-nation unity. It merely specifies that the modern 
nation derived its name, official language, national symbolism, conception of territorial 
boundaries and its history from the ethnic group or groups that inhabited the land in pre-
modern times.8  
 In the case of the United States, the national ethnic group was Anglo-American 
Protestant ("American"). This was the first European group to "imagine" the territory9 of 
                                                          
6 E.K. Francis, Interethnic Relations, (New York: Elsevier, 1976), 6. 
7 A.D. Smith, National Identity, (London: Penguin, 1991), 69. 
8 Smith 1991, 39. 
9 The sense of national territory embraced by the Anglo-Americans was, in the first instance, regional, and 
was also elastic - tending to advance with the frontier. Even so, there was a generalized appreciation of the 
grandeur and fertility of the American landscape, which, during the nineteenth century, was believed to be 
a source of national invigoration and a hedge against European decadence. See Merle Eugene Curti, The 
Roots of American Loyalty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 37-38. The Daniel 
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the United States as its homeland and trace its genealogy back to New World colonists 
who rebelled against their mother country. In its mind, the American nation-state, its 
land, its history, its mission and its Anglo-American people were woven into one great 
tapestry of the imagination. This social construction considered the United States to be 
founded by the "Americans", who thereby had title to the land and the mandate to mould 
the nation (and any immigrants who might enter it) in their own Anglo-Saxon, Protestant 
self-image.   
  
Colonial Antecedents 
 
Ethno-Religious Homogeneity 
 
The origins of Anglo-American ethnicity may be traced to the settlement patterns that 
characterized the United States during the colonial period. David Hackett Fischer writes 
that the United States began as a collection of cultural regions based around core English 
settler groups. New England was dominated by the Puritans, the Middle Atlantic by the 
Quakers, the Coastal South by southern English Cavaliers and the Appalachian hinterland 
by Anglo-Scottish Presbyterians.10 
 Most of this "colonial stock" had arrived in the seventeenth century from Britain. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Boone/Pathfinder myth, which dated from the 1820's, though largely narrated by New England writers, 
concerned the frontier from Tennessee to Pennsylvania, and can arguably be treated as a national image,  
"the embodiment of an America as rooted as the soil, as primordial as the Germany that gave birth to 
Siegfried." See Miller, Perry, Nature's Nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 10. 
10 David Hackett Fischer, Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 787. This is, of course, a contentious thesis. Fischer's critics tend to accuse him of 
over-generalization: they grant that he has identified important cultural forces, but insist that the cultural 
regions (both British and American) which he denotes are more complex than he imagines. Local variation 
within cultural regions, and non-core ethnic/regional fragments are fingered as dimensions of this 
complexity. Critics also claim that several groups other than the English (notably the Fenno-Scandinavians 
and native Indians in the backcountry and the blacks in the lowland south) have had a major impact on 
American folkways. See reviews by Wilbur Zelinsky, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
Vol. 81, No. 3 (September 1991), 526-31; Kenneth Morgan, Social History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (October 1991), 
373-75; Jack Greene, Journal of Social History, Vol.24, No. 4 (Summer 1991), 909-11; Colin Brooks, 
Journal of American Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (August 1991), 275-78.  
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Hence it is not surprising that the American free population on the eve of revolution was 
over 60 per cent English, nearly 80 per cent British and 98 per cent Protestant. 
Immigration usually made up less than 15-20 per cent of the colonies' white population 
growth.11  
 
Colonial Integration 
 
Colonial America, while relatively homogenous ethnically, did embrace great sectarian 
diversity.12 Yet, despite this religious heterogeneity, one unifying characteristic of 
American Protestantism was its non-conformity: Quakers, Mennonites, 
Congregationalists, Huguenots and Baptists were conspicuous in this regard. Even the 
"established" Episcopalian and Presbyterian churches were far less hierarchically 
organized in the United States than in Britain. 13  
There is no question that antagonism between various Protestant sects abounded 
in the colonial United States, particularly in seventeenth-century New England, where 
Congregationalism was an established, intolerant Church.14 However, this did not 
preclude the existence of a more generalized Protestant identity, which strengthened 
greatly after independence, something we shall later discuss in greater detail. One early 
manifestation of this identity was popular anti-Catholicism.  
By the early eighteenth century, a tradition of anti-Catholicism had become well-
established in Britain, forged through protracted warfare with France and fanned by a 
                                                          
11 Richard A.Easterlin, "Economic and Social Characteristics of the Immigrants" in Richard A. Easterlin (et 
al), Immigration (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1982), 56. 
12 Wilbur Zelinsky, The Cultural Geography of the United States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 
Inc., 1973), 13. 
13 Richard Brookhiser, The Way of the WASP (New York: Free Press 1991), 26; Wade Clark Roof and 
William McKinney, American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1987), 31. 
14 For example, the Congregational Church was disestablished in Connecticut in 1708 as a result of the 
colony's toleration acts. This did not occur in Massachusetts until 1733. See Terry Alan Baney, Yankees 
and the City: struggling over urban representation in Connecticut, 1880 to World War I (Unpublished 
PhD. dissertation, the University of Connecticut, 1989), 5. 
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stream of popular pamphlet literature.15 This feeling was reflected in colonial institutions: 
in the American colonies prior to 1700, only Rhode Island gave Catholics full civil and 
religious liberty. After the Revolution, most states continued to carry anti-Catholic 
statutes on their books.16 The French and Indian War of 1754-63 helped to ignite anti-
Catholic sensibilities. The treatment of the Acadian expelees illustrates the degree to 
which an exclusive Anglo-Protestant consciousness operated in the period just prior to 
independence:  
 
Lawrence's original intention was to scatter the [Acadian] exiles throughout the 
British North American colonies…But…fear, hatred, and acute distrust for all 
things French dominated in the hearts and minds of the Atlantic seaboard settlers, 
such that at no time were the Acadian exiles given more than grudging 
acceptance….17  
 
The Acadians' language and religion made them pariahs in the American colonies, where 
they were, nearly irrespective of location, forced into indentured servitude and reduced to 
extreme poverty. Roughly a third died of disease and exposure, prompting the rest to 
migrate, after a sojourn in France, to Catholic, French-speaking Louisiana during  
1765-85.  
The spread of several important ideas, which had their origin in New England, 
also added to the fibre of Anglo-American ethnicity. New England's Puritan sense of 
election and mission, and its description of America as a New Canaan, or promised land, 
slowly came to infect the entire nation.18 Its vision also came to influence the American 
outlook through a nation-wide religious revival known as the Great Awakening (1725-
                                                          
15 Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1992), 40-42. 
16 Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism 
(New York, NY: Macmillan 1938), 9, 21. 
17 James H. Dormon, The People Called Cajuns: An Introduction to an Ethnohistory (Lafayette, LA: 
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1983), 16-17. 
18 Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millenial Role (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), 103-6, 110-11. 
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50). John Armstrong has noted that religion provided one of the few vehicles of mass 
communication in the pre-modern era and it was religion that was largely responsible for 
American intercolonial integration in the eighteenth century.19 Led by Jonathan Edwards, 
amongst others, the Great Awakening spread like wildfire across the colonies from New 
England to Georgia and is described by some as the first instance of American self-
consciousness.20  
At the same time, Boston emerged as a colonial centre of liberal thought. 21 This 
development coincided with a notable increase in intercolonial communication and a 
growing concern with American events and symbols, especially after 1760.22 New York's 
emergence as a centre of commercial publishing similarly advanced the national reach of 
New England writers.23 As Tocqueville commented in the 1830's: "The principles of New 
England spread at first to the neighboring states; they then passed successively to the 
more distant ones; and at length they imbued the whole Confederation. They now extend 
their influence over the whole American world."24  
                                                          
19 John Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 
201-3. 
20 Wilbur Zelinsky, Nation Into State: The Shifting Symbolic Foundations of American Nationalism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988), 226. 
21 Solomon, 2. 
22 Richard Merritt has documented this trend with a content analysis of major journals in both the North 
and the South from 1735. See Richard L. Merritt, Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775 (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1966), 66-74. 
23 Early nineteenth-century men of letters like William Cullen Bryant, James Fenimore Cooper, 
Washington Irving and Edgar Allan Poe resided in New York, and exchanged ideas via literary journals 
like Knickerbocker Magazine and the Democratic Review in the 1820's and 1830's. See Thomas Bender, 
New York Intellect: A History of Intellectual Life in New York City, from 1750 to the Beginnings of Our 
Own Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1987),  141. 
24 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Introduction by Alan Ryan. (London: David Campbell 
Publishers, 1994. First published 1835.), 33. Notwithstanding Tocqueville's monocausal explanation, New 
England's influence was mediated by that of other regions. The South, especially the lowland South, was a 
particularly important source of divergence, with its relatively hierarchical division of white labour, its 
dearth of large urban areas and its plantation slavery system. Differences between North and South must be 
placed in context, however - the South participated in many of the social changes that gripped the north 
between 1800 and 1850. Indeed, the narration of southern distinctiveness, to say nothing of nationalism, 
was a feature of the late antebellum period. Common adherence to the Yeoman ideal and western 
expansion (Jefferson and Jackson were exemplars) and a keen interest in the nature of American national 
identity were part of the shared cultural orientation of both North and South, though tension between the 
Yeoman and Cavalier motifs emerged in Southern discourse by the 1830's. See William R. Taylor, 
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The Consequences of Revolution  
 
Prior to the American Revolution, the United States participated in a transatlantic, 
mercantile society in which ideas, personnel and goods passed freely between the North 
American colonies, Britain and other parts of Empire like the Caribbean. The American 
elite, whether urban or rural, northern or southern, was an important participant in this 
transatlantic dialogue. This American imperial class maintained its connections with the 
transatlantic debate after the Revolution, in the process helping to shape an American 
national consciousness distinct from Britain.25  
 The Revolution was by no means a clear-cut nationalist movement, but began as a 
civil war that split Whig and Tory in Britain, the United States and in what was to 
become Canada.26 In fact, British Whig intellectuals like Edmund Burke and Charles 
James Fox encouraged the American Revolutionaries, while members of the colonial 
Whig elite like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington became convinced of the need 
for independence no sooner than a year or two before the Revolution.27 In fact, in much of 
the Middle Atlantic and in parts of the South, Tories were a majority, but eventually, the 
Whig vision prevailed and the Revolution began to be woven into a new American ethno-
history, in which a nation of small-farming Davids had vanquished the Imperial Goliath.  
Many scholars would concur with the view that an American sense of community 
arose, complete with its heroic mythology, but most would label this a civic national 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character (New York: George Braziller 
1961), 16, 316-17. 
25 Robert Burchell discusses the connections between post-Revolutionary English and American upper-
class culture in "The Role of the Upper Class in the Formation of American Culture, 1780-1840," in R.A. 
Burchell (ed), The End of Anglo-America: Historical Essays in the Study of Cultural Divergence 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press 1991), 184-212. For more on the same theme, see 
Brooks, 278.    
26 For more on Canada's American Tory legacy, see Kaufmann, Eric, 'Condemned to Rootlessness: The 
Loyalist Origins of Canada's Identity Crisis,' Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1997). 
27 Richard M. Burkey,  Ethnic and Racial Groups: The Dynamics of Dominance (Menlo Park: Cummings, 
1978), 158, and W. Stewart Wallace, United Empire Loyalists: the Beginnings of British Canada (Toronto: 
Glasgow, Brook and Co., 1921), 13. 
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process rather than an ethnic one. Yet from the outset, the words and actions of 
Americans indicate that a growing sense of American ethnicity underpinned the civic 
rhetoric. This ethnicity grew out of a sense of isolation that Oscar Handlin calls "the 
horror" of rootlessness brought on by the colonists' incessant migration and the 
ontological meaninglessness of living in alien surroundings.28  
One scholar who has studied the nature of this ethnic response is Rogers M. 
Smith, who has dubbed it "Ascriptive Americanism." The French and Indian wars of the 
1750's and early 1760's had driven home the differences between the English-speaking, 
Protestant American colonists and their nonwhite, Catholic/pagan and French/Indian-
speaking "other." Furthermore, the Proclamation of 1763 had stymied what the Anglo-
Protestant colonists deemed to be their providential mission to settle the Catholic-
occupied trans-Allegheny west. Accordingly, Smith holds that many Americans were 
unaware of liberal rights theories, and were only persuaded to revolt by the religious and 
cultural arguments that designated them a chosen, white, Protestant people.29  
Hence for Alexander Hamilton, the Quebec Act of 1774, which retained the laws 
and customs of the French in Canada (despite the presence of thousands of British 
Protestant residents), reflected the fact that British monarchists and French Catholics 
were united in their support for hierarchy and tyranny against the republican Americans: 
 
This act [Quebec Act] makes effectual provision not only for the protection, but 
for the permanent support of Popery…What can speak in plainer language, the 
corruption of the British Parliament, than its act; which…makes such ample 
provision for the popish religion, and leaves the protestant, in such 
disadvantageous situation that he is like to have no other subjects in this part of 
his domain [Canada], than Roman catholics….30  
 
                                                          
28 Oscar Handlin, Race and nationality in American Life (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), 130. 
29 Rogers Smith, "American Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service", in Amitai Etzioni (ed), New 
Communitarian Thinking (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 237-39.   
30 Hamilton, Alexander, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. I, edited by Harold C. Syrett (New York 
& London: Columbia University Press, [1775] 1961), 170, 175. 
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As several theorists have remarked, a sense of election is a feature common to 
many ethnic groups, especially Protestant ones, and it appears that the Americans were 
no exception.31 In more general terms, these American developments may be viewed as 
part of a more universal phenomenon in which individuals seek to achieve a measure of 
belonging and terrestrial immortality through identification with a group rooted in land 
and kinship.32 The result is ethnogenesis.  
  It is also significant that a set of symbolic "border guards" were being used to 
distinguish the Americans from surrounding populations. The Americans were 
considered to be White, in contrast to the Natives and black slaves, they were Protestant 
and English (in speech and surname), unlike the Catholic French to the north and west 
and the Spanish to the south, and they were Liberal democrats, in contrast to the British, 
both at home and in the colonies to the north.  
 
The Protestant "Establishment" 
 
In the decades following independence, America's Protestant33 unity - which the 
treatment of the Acadians underscored - soon began to crystallize around a Protestant 
"voluntary establishment" centred on the major theological seminaries.34 The non-
sectarian nature of the American constitution and the disestablishment of the 
Congregational Church in New England were the first steps along the road to Protestant 
                                                          
31 See Armstrong, 81-90 for discussion of the antemurale/ghazi concept. Armstrong's analysis of the 
crusade-jihad spiral of holy war on pages 59-61 is also instructive as is Connor Cruise O'Brien's, in 
God:Land: reflections on religion and nationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 23-42. 
32 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 175. 
33 Not all American Protestants were British, of course. The Protestant unity to which I refer was most 
explicit among the mainline British denominations, but can be seen to encompass larger numbers through 
both the Protestant inflection of the secular culture and the pan-Protestant assimilation process - which is 
treated later in this article. 
34 Hutchison, William R. (ed.), Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in 
America, 1900-1960 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4, 303. 
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unity.35 Two other important forces promoting Protestant unity were public schooling and 
voluntary associations. Public schools, like churches, reached only a fraction of the 
dispersed American population in the eighteenth century. Yet, by the early nineteenth 
century, inter-denominational education was flourishing: "In the cities of the East as well 
as in the pioneer western states," remarks Timothy Smith, "an adequate educational 
system required the cooperative efforts of men of many religious persuasions. These 
efforts nurtured the growth of an interdenominational spirit, a Protestant consensus, 
which became a principal element in the nation's consciousness of its identity."36  
Public funding for Catholic schooling was not an issue until the 1840's, in New 
York City and Philadelphia, when it was mooted by Anglo-Protestant antipathy.37 Hence 
it is instructive to consider the Protestant influence in public school texts - which all 
participating American children read - in the early nineteenth century. In addition to 
required readings from the King James Bible, American public schools did not mince 
words about the Protestant nature of the nation. In early nineteenth century history texts, 
"the true religion is patently limited to Protestantism. Catholicism is depicted not only as 
a false religion, but as a positive danger to the state; it subverts good government, sound 
morals, and education." Even more revealing of Anglo-Protestant attachment is the 
surprising revelation that history texts, beginning in the 1790's, portrayed Britain in 
largely benign terms. From the 1820's onward, the notion of Americans as genealogical 
descendants of Englishmen also gained in currency.38 
Inter-denominational Protestant nationalism was likewise bolstered by the rapid 
growth of voluntary associations, which were sprouting at the rate of 70 per year by 
1820. Anti-Catholic fraternal societies were represented among the new civic 
                                                          
35 Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New York, 1963), 55-
71. 
36 Timothy Smith, "Protestant Schooling and American Nationality, 1800-1850," The Journal of American 
History, March, 1967, 680-83, 694-95. 
37 Knobel, 57-58. 
38 Ruth Miller Elson, Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1964), 47-53, 105, 121-23. 
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associations of the 1820's, providing the organizational base from which nativist agitation 
would later spring.39 The ecumenical movement within mainstream Protestantism also 
drew on anti-Catholic antipathy, a platform evident within the Disciples of Christ, an 
ecumenist sect formed in 1819, and in the Society for the Promotion of Christian Union 
(SPCU), founded in 1839. Following closely from the precedent set by the SPCU, The 
Evangelical Alliance for the United States (1847), precursor to the Federal Council of 
Churches (1908),40 brought together leading Protestant clergy from the nation's major 
denominations. Like its secular counterparts, this voluntary organization drank heavily 
from the springs of anti-Catholicism.41  
 
The Anglo-Saxon Myth  
 
American ethnogenesis was closely tied to the American nation-state's Whig origins and 
the work of Whig historians helped to define the genealogy of the new Republic. The 
idea that the pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxons had known a primitive form of freedom that 
had its roots in the German forests had emerged in England by the sixteenth century. 
Some of the more radical variants of the theory held that the Anglo-Saxons carried a 
desire for freedom in their veins, and had a destiny to realize this impulse. These ideas 
found a very fertile audience across the Atlantic. Eighteenth century "Real Whig"  
historians  like James Burgh and Catharine Macaulay stand out in this regard.42 These 
                                                          
39 Knobel, 32-34. 
40 The FCC was conceived with the anti-Catholic plank still in its platform. However, liberal movements 
within ecumenical Protestantism led to the removal of anti-Catholicism from the Council's list of concerns 
by 1910. (Cavert 1968: 54-56) 
41 Philip D. Jordan, The Evangelical Alliance for the United States of America, 1847-1900: Ecumenism, 
Identity, and the Religion of the Republic (New York, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1982), 34, 42; Roof & 
McKinney, 85-87; Robert A. Schneider, "Voice of Many Waters: Church Federation in the Twentieth 
Century," in Hutchison, William R. (ed.). Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment 
in America, 1900-1960 (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 99-100. 
42 H. Trevor Colbourn, Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1965), 30, 183-84, 194-98 is a particularly 
good source for American Anglo-Saxonism. See also Allen J. Frantzen & John D. Niles (eds), Anglo-
Saxonism and the Construction of Social Identity (Gainesville: University Press of Florida 1997) or 
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interpreters of English history directly influenced the American independence movement.  
In Reginald Horsman's words,  
 
 The various ingredients in the myth of Anglo-Saxon England, clearly 
 delineated in a host of seventeenth and eighteenth-century works, now appear 
 again in American protests: Josiah Quincy Jr., wrote of the popular nature of 
 the Anglo-Saxon militia; Sam Adams stressed the old English freedoms 
 defended in the Magna Carta; Benjamin Franklin stressed the freedom that the 
 Anglo-Saxons enjoyed in emigrating to England; Charles Carroll depicted Saxon 
 liberties torn away by William the Conqueror; Richard Bland argued that the 
 English Constitution and Parliament stemmed from the Anglo-Saxon   
period....George Washington admired the pro-Saxon history of Catharine 
 Macaulay and she visited him at Mount Vernon after the Revolution.43 
  
Were these prominent Americans merely expressing an abstract ideological exuberance 
which happened to have an English historical referent? Liah Greenfeld appears to take 
this stance, arguing that Americans equated Englishness with Liberalism and no more.44 
Yet such an argument cannot explain the infatuation with the Anglo-Saxons displayed by 
the statesmen of the new Republic. Explicit in this regard was U.S. president and 
founding father Thomas Jefferson, who proclaimed to John Adams in 1776 that the 
Americans were "the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a 
pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from 
whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form 
of government we have assumed." (emphasis added)45 
 Notice that Jefferson has distinguished between the Americans' ideological and 
genealogical inheritance, both of which he saw as deriving from the Anglo-Saxons. The 
idea that the Anglo-Saxon English had self-selected themselves through immigration to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 1959). 
43 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 12. 
44 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992), 409. 
45 Horsman, 22. 
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escape the British (Norman) yoke and bring the torch of freedom to America was a 
quintessential myth of ethnogenesis.46 Accompanying purified religion and purified 
liberty therefore, was a purified American genealogy. In this manner, the Americans, like 
the Québécois, Afrikaners and Anatolian Turks, were performing a feat of particularistic 
fission from the mother stock which would form the basis for an entirely new ethnic 
group.  
 
The Institutionalization of Anglo-Saxon Ethnicity 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon myth, meanwhile, was grafted onto American experience. For 
instance, the New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal council 
while the statements of Tacitus regarding the free, egalitarian qualities of the Anglo-
Saxons he encountered were given an American interpretation.47 The most widely-read 
American historians of the late nineteenth century: George Bancroft, William Prescott, 
John Motley and Francis Parkman, helped popularize the myth as did academics in 
University English literature departments.48  
 
 
The nineteenth and early twentieth century historiography of American presidents like 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson provides yet further evidence that the Anglo-
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Saxon myth was a historicist force in the American conscience collective.49       
    What is less clear is the extent to which the Anglo-Saxon myth penetrated down 
the social scale. While it is difficult to ascertain whether a majority were aware of the 
Whig formulation of the Anglo-Saxon myth, unless totally isolated from non-Anglo-
Saxons, they were conscious of their "WASP" cultural markers (White race, "Anglo-
Saxon" in speech and surname, Protestant in religion) and understood themselves to be 
"Anglo-Saxon".50 It is evident, however, that firm conclusions in this area await further 
historical research. 
 
The Origins of Anglo-Conformity  
 
The process of assimilation that has helped maintain ethnic boundaries throughout 
history had an early start in the United States with the anglicization process, or what 
Milton Gordon and Will Herberg have called anglo-conformity.51 This phrase describes a 
process of dominant-conformity that is nearly universal among national ethnic groups, as 
terms like Turkification, Magyarization and Russification indicate.52 In the U.S., 
immigrants were to be made into Americans by embracing American English, American 
Liberty, American Protestantism and, ultimately, by intermarrying with Americans.  
Anglo-conformity had its roots in the pre-Revolutionary era with the Society for 
Propagating Christian Knowledge among Germans. Founded in the mid-eighteenth 
century by Benjamin Franklin and Anglican minister William Smith, the society pursued 
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what it called the "anglicization" of Pennsylvania's large German population.53 After the 
revolution, attempts to have federal laws printed in German (1796) and to gain official 
status for German in schools and courts (1837) were rebuffed. The result was a gradual 
assimilation of Pennsylvania's German population. This was especially pronounced 
among the Mennonites, whose close theological affiliation with the Quakers rapidly 
created an "extended cousinage" among the different communities of eastern 
Pennsylvania.54  
Other groups to undergo assimilation included the Welsh and Scots, whose 
languages were all but dead in America by the early nineteenth century, as well as the 
Huguenots, who in the nineteenth century disappeared entirely. 55 A similar fate befell the 
Dutch and Swedes, something not lost on Peter Kalm, an 18th century Swedish botanist 
who wrote of New York in the mid eighteenth century that "the majority… who were of 
Dutch descent, were succumbing to the English language. The younger generation 
scarcely ever spoke anything but English, and there were many who became offended if 
they were taken for Dutch because they preferred to pass for English."56  
  Of similar significance was the "WASP" form to which these non-English groups 
were assimilating. In addition to adopting the American English language and the 
American belief in liberty, they even began to alter their surnames. Among Pennsylvania 
Germans, for example, Zimmermann became Carpenter and Rittinghuysen was changed 
to Rittenhouse, while among the Huguenots, revolutionary Paul Revere's surname reflects 
a change from the French Rivoire while John Greenleaf Whittier's mother's family had 
originally been called Feuillevert. All of these developments led eighteenth century 
American statesmen like John Jay and Jedediah Morse to consider their people 
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"essentially English" in ancestry despite the presence of some continental Europeans. 57 
Jay made the point very clear in the second Federalist paper when he opined that 
"Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people; a 
people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the 
same religion...very similar in their manners and customs."58 
 A halt in immigration also contributed to the assimilation process. The War of 
Independence, for instance, brought immigration to the colonies to a virtual standstill and 
during the 1793-1814 period, only three thousand immigrants arrived per year.59 This 
hiatus created the conditions which allowed the various ethnic groups in the new country 
to draw closer together and lose their differences. As Richard Burkey puts it, "although 
pockets of European ethnicity still remained, by 1820 the great majority of the citizens of 
the new country were subscribing to a new ethnicity-American; only the racial groups 
were excluded from membership."60 Since the blacks and native Indians were not entitled 
to participate in civic affairs they cannot be considered part of the American nation and, 
therefore, the Americans at this point must be considered one of the world's first ethnic 
nations.61  
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The Anglo-Americans in Theoretical Context 
 
With regard to ethnicity theory, the American case can be framed within the broader 
ethnogenetic process. Typically, ethnies form either through fission from a parent stock: 
i.e. Ulster Protestants from Scots, Dutch from Greater Germans, Quebecois from French, 
Afrikaners from Dutch; or fusion with other ethnies or ethnic fragments: i.e. Mexican 
Mestizos from Aztecs and Spanish Creoles; English from Anglo-Saxons, Normans and 
Celtic Britons; or Japanese from Chinese, Koreans and Southeast Asians.62  
Fission and fusion are processes that create ethnies, but more often, as Fredrik 
Barth points out, ethnic boundaries tend to remain relatively stable while population 
flows back and forth across them. During such a process, ethnies accrete new members to 
their core through assimilation. The Zulus, Greeks, Jews and Magyars are all good 
examples of ethnies that have absorbed newcomers arguably more numerous than the 
original core stock.63 
 Given the foregoing, we can now specify the nature of American national 
ethnicity: it emerged through ethnic fission from an English Protestant parent stock and, 
like most ethnies, followed the Barthian model and employed methods of dominant-
conformity to accrete diverse immigrant populations to its ethnic core while maintaining 
its ethnic boundaries.64 What complicates this otherwise simple picture is the pride with 
which "Americans" viewed their liberal civilization, a pride which occasionally 
expressed itself in the form of "extravagant" universalist rhetoric. 
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The Exceptionalist Fallacy: "Double-Consciousness" and Cosmopolitan Rhetoric 
 
The symbol of liberalism, as noted, proved useful in reinforcing "American" ethnic 
particularism. Nevertheless, one should not to gloss over the underlying theoretical 
conflict between liberalism and ethnicity. There was this tension in American culture, 
one which gave serious consideration to both liberal principles and ethnic boundary 
defense and furiously tried to marry the two. This is borne out by a less selective analysis 
of the writings of those very authors most often used to provide examples of the 
cosmopolitanism of America. For instance, what would exceptionalists make of Emerson, 
who proffered that America was: 
 
The asylum of all nations...the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and 
Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will 
construct a new race...as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the 
smelting pot of the Dark Ages.65  
 
While nevertheless maintaining (around the same time) that: 
 
It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever 
occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human 
family...The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before 
the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done  
obeisance. 66   
 
We would do well not to pass judgement on Emerson (a noted liberal who opposed both 
nativism and slavery) because his dualistic attitudes were entirely in keeping with those 
of his contemporaries. For example, Walt Whitman, influenced by Anglo-Saxonist 
philology, wrote in Leaves of Grass (1855) that "the Anglo-Saxon stock of our language 
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[is]… the most important part, the root and strong speech of the native English for many 
centuries", later adding that "I think the Saxon has an element no other language has."67 
Herman Melville, meanwhile, wrote that the U.S. was "settled by the people of all nations 
[and that] all nations may claim her for their own", yet he admired the anti-Catholic 
popular literature of the 1840's and 50's as an expression of the people, failing to 
approach nativist sentiment with the same critical stance he did the class and slavery 
issues of the day.68 
Alexis de Tocqueville's writing contained similar dualities, at once commenting 
on the cosmopolitan rootlessness of the United States while observing that: 
 
 There is hardly an American to be met with who does not claim some remote 
 kindred with the first founders of the colonies; and as for the scions of the noble 
 families of England, America seemed to me to be covered with them.69 
 
Tocqueville also repeatedly referred to the Americans as the "English race in America" or 
the "Anglo-Americans", indicating that he felt the three terms were basically 
interchangeable. It seems Tocqueville's cosmopolitan view of America was merely a 
rhetorical tool used only in his more futuristic moments. The same duality can be 
observed in the writings of Crèvecoeur, Jefferson, Franklin and Hamilton and probably 
had its roots in the Old Testament with which Protestants were so familiar.  
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As Conor Cruise O'Brien notes, the Bible's message at this point was largely particularist, 
as when it was written: 
  
Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then 
 ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine. 
 And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation.  
 (Exodus 19:5-6). 
 
Yet despite the predominantly ethnic tone, the selective reader could tease out some 
universalist passages such as: 
 
 Know ye therefore that they which are of faith, the same are the children of 
 Abraham. And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen 
 through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham saying, In thee shall 
 all nations be blessed. So then they which be of faith are blessed with faithful 
 Abraham (Gal. 3:6-9).70 
 
In the Bible, as in the writing of many Americans, a predominantly ethnic message is in 
tension with the logical implications of an underlying universalist communal philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan utterances that Emerson referred to as "extravagant 
declamations" should not be construed as representative of the temper of the times. 
Instead, they should be treated as the futuristic, cosmopolitan side of a dualistic 
American mind which clung just as surely to an Anglo-Saxon, Protestant vision of the 
nation. This psyche was described by Emerson as one of "double-consciousness" 
whereby the quest for security, exemplified by "race" (ethnic group) and family, could be 
reconciled with the quest for individuality, represented by associative friendship and 
liberal universalism. 71 
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Romantic Nationalism and the Republican "Golden Age" 
 
"When we see, among the happiest people in the world, groups of peasants directing 
affairs of state under an oak, and always acting wisely, can we help but despise the 
refinements of those nations which render themselves illustrious and miserable by so 
much art and mystery?"72 With characteristic aplomb, Jean-Jacques Rousseau expressed 
the zeitgeist of a new cultural movement known as romanticism which took root in 
eighteenth century Europe and proved especially influential in the following century. 
Based on the idea of raw nature as the source of power and wisdom, it carried within it a 
critique of rational, civilized modernity.  
In Germany, romantic scholars like Herder, Hegel or Fichte developed the idea 
that nations are organic outgrowths of nature whose natural destiny is to express 
themselves through independent statehood.73 This led intellectuals, notably among 
conquered peoples (but also among independent, Republican nations), to espouse the 
cause of ethno-nationalism. 74 Scholars in America, like their European counterparts, 
participated in these romantic nationalist activities. Earlier, we described the romantic 
American interest in Anglo-Saxon liberties, an interest which pre-dated the 
Revolutionary era. This line of thinking had inspired Jefferson to tell English radical John 
Cartwright "that he hoped Virginia would divide its counties into wards of six miles 
square, for these 'would answer to the hundreds of your Saxon Alfred.' "75 Jefferson's 
vision glorified the Yeoman, or independent farmer, as the cornerstone of the Republic, 
and he believed that the nation gained strength from the Yeoman's contact with nature.  
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In the early nineteenth century, American romantics embraced Jefferson's vision, 
but also endorsed a bombastic, expansionist Americanism, exemplified by the view that 
the American continent was to be settled by the surging energy of the "primeval" Anglo-
Saxon race. Walt Whitman captured this spirit of ethnic chauvinism well when he 
exclaimed: "What has miserable inefficient Mexico...to do...with the mission of peopling 
the New World with a noble race?"76 Whitman's interest in Anglo-Saxon philology, part 
of a widespread literary movement in the 1850's known variously as Gothicism or Anglo-
Saxonism, can be explained as another instance of the same romantic thinking.  
Yet the Gothicism of Whitman, Poe, Emerson and others had begun, by the 
1850's, to exhibit a nostalgic sensibility that scorned the expansionist, utilitarian 
industrialism of the new America. Washington Irving's Rip Van Winkle (1819) and 
Nathaniel Hawthorne's Ambitious Guest (1835) provide early examples of this thinking. 
In both cases, there is a lament that the acquisitive attitude of the Yankee has left him 
blind to nature's more sublime virtues. In a similar vein, in Among the Hills (1869), John 
Greenleaf Whittier wrote: 
 
 Our yeoman should be equal to his home, 
 Set in the fair, green valleys, purple walled, 
 A man to match his mountains, not to creep, 
 Dwarfed and abased below them.77  
 
In the minds of romantic nationalists such as these, the new economy, which increasingly 
bound farmers to agents from urban centres, was seen to undermine their independence, 
and, by extension, that of the Yeoman Republic. Cities were viewed as sinful and 
unnatural. This sentiment clearly animated Boston reformer-socialist Wendell Phillips, 
who in the 1860's proclaimed that: "My idea of a civilization is a very high one, but the 
                                                          
76 Horsman, 235. 
77 Ian Stuart Marshall, Mountains to Match the Man: National Identity and the Mountain in American 
Literature (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Delaware, 1988), 269. 
 24
approach to it is a New England town of some two thousand inhabitants, with no rich 
man and no poor man in it; all mingling in the same society...That's New England as it 
was fifty years ago....[The] civilization that lingers beautifully on the hillsides of New 
England, nestles sweetly in the valleys of Vermont, the moment it approaches a crowd 
like Boston, or a million men gathered in one place like New York, it rots."78 
 
The American Golden Age 
 
The theme of the Golden Age has been arguably a universal among nations and 
ethnic groups since Hesiod first introduced the concept. It represents an idealized period 
in the past when the collective was seen to be united and heroic. Typically, the romantic 
nationalist views the present as an age of decline and seeks to use the myth of an 
idealized past to revive the virtues which were seen to characterize the national ethnic 
group during its Golden Age.79 The nostalgia that pervaded the writing of many mid-
nineteenth century Americans may thus be considered a form of romantic yearning for a 
purer, more "natural" Golden Age Republic. It was this nostalgia which was to fire the 
ethnic nationalist phenomenon known as nativism which later came to grip the land. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has tried to illustrate that the United States was not an exception to the rule 
that nations are formed by core ethnic groups which later attempt to shape the nation in 
their own image. The American case betrays many of the same features that characterize 
other ethnic groups. These include: a sense of election (Puritan), a myth of exclusive 
genealogical descent (Anglo-Saxon), a set of cultural boundary markers ('WASP'), a 
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process of dominant-conformity (anglo-conformity), an association with a specific 
territory (United States/Frontier), a lifestyle representation (Yeoman) and a communal 
Golden Age (Jefferson's Republic) to which the group seeks to return. Together, these 
elements formed the myth-symbol complex of the "American" ethnie. This ethnic 
structure, once crystallized, decisively shaped the reactions of the American nation for a 
over a century. 
 If the Anglo-Americans had not considered themselves an indigenous American 
ethnic group, they might have reacted to new immigrants in a less proprietary fashion. 
Moreover, without a Golden Age republican ideal to filter events, American reaction to 
industrialization and urbanization may not have taken on such stridently nostalgic 
overtones. The defensive, romantic impetus behind the Know-Nothing, Populist, 100 per 
cent American, Ku Klux Klan, and Immigration Restrictionist movements might thereby 
have been muted. The anglocentric America that actually emerged might instead have 
developed as a more pluralistic society, like that found in present-day Mauritius or 
Trinidad, where no acknowledged founding group exists. Scholars have often ignored the 
role of national ethnicity in the American case, believing that the nativism of an 
exceptional nation requires an exceptional explanation. Hopefully this oversight can now 
be corrected. 
